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Forthcoming in I. Wallerstein, R. Collins, M. Mann, G. Derluguian and C. Calhoun: 
Does Capitalism Have a Future? (Oxford University Press 2013) 
 
5.  What Threatens Capitalism Now? 
 
Craig Calhoun 
 
 Capitalism appears to be surviving the worst financial and economic crisis since the 
Great Depression. Though its lows were not as low, in  the  world’s  rich  countries  this has 
brought a longer period of depressed or absent growth than the Depression itself. Moreover, 
the current crisis comes on the heels of a damaging era of lopsided financialization, neoliberal 
weakening of social institutions, and intensified inequality. This exacerbates problems, 
undercuts capacity to deal with them, and reduces the buffers that protect ordinary people 
from the effects of economics upheaval. Investors are still making money; no states have 
completely collapsed. Yet the future looks precarious.  
However, this and most talk of collapse, reflects views from the old core countries of 
the capitalist world-system and their close neighbors as they lose their privileged and 
profitable position. The views are different from many places in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. The current crisis both reveals and accelerates a shift of economic momentum away 
from longstanding core economies in Europe and North America towards newly developing 
regions. A key question for the future of capitalism is whether this momentum can be 
sustained. Capitalism is being transformed through this West to East and North to South shift, 
perhaps in ways that will restore its vitality. But the rapidly growing economies also face 
challenges. And renewed capitalist growth in  the  old  “core”  economies  also depends on 
transformation, particularly in the relationship of capitalism to political power and social 
institutions. Crucially, capitalism is vulnerable not just to market upheavals, excessive risk-
taking, or poorly managed banks but also to wars, environmental degradation and climate 
change, and crises of social solidarity and welfare.   
 To think well about how capitalism may face decline, or be renewed, or be 
transformed, we need to recognize that it is not a perfectly self-contained system. One may 
abstract from more complex historical conditions to examine a putatively pure capitalist 
system. But the lived reality of capitalism always involves articulation with non-capitalist 
economic activity and with political, social, and cultural factors; it is a legal and institutional 
as well as an economic system. And many of the deepest threats capitalism faces come from 
its dependence on factors beyond the purely economic. 
 I will argue against the notion that capitalist collapse is imminent, and suggest that if 
capitalism were to lose its dominant place in global economic affairs this would more likely 
come about through protracted transformation and the rise of other kinds of economic 
organization  alongside  continuing  capitalist  activity.  But  this  doesn’t  mean  capitalism’s  long-
term future is assured.   
 
First, there remain issues of systemic risk and the balance of finance with other 
economic sectors. Second, capitalist profitability often depends on externalizing the costs of 
its activities – human and ecological as well as financial. Issues like pollution or 
unemployment in volatile markets demand the attention of governments or other social 
institutions. There is a deficit of institutions to do this work; social development has lagged 
behind economic growth where capitalist growth is newly rapid, and neoliberalism and 
inequality have weakened the institutional capacities of Western countries and even created 
challenges for political legitimacy. Third, capitalism is vulnerable not only to “intra-economic”  
or institutional factors, but also to external issues like climate change and war. There are 
questions about the extent to which capitalism – that historically unparalleled machine for 
 2 
producing economic growth - is up against environmental limits to growth and potential 
geopolitical conflicts exacerbated by unequal growth.  
 
In each of these areas, dealing with the threats to capitalism may transform it, not 
cause its collapse. Together, they may bring about a world in which capitalism remains 
enormously important and potentially recovers some of its vitality, but is no longer able to 
organize and dominate a world-system to the degree it has through recent history. 
 
 
Why not collapse? 
 
The idea of capitalism simply collapsing, as say the Soviet Union collapsed, is a bit 
misleading. This implies suddenness, a transition over just a few years from existing to not 
existing. The Soviet Union could cease to exist almost overnight because it was a particular 
institutional structure – a state – and its legal form could be dissolved. But capitalism is not 
strictly analogous. 
 
As a state, the USSR was a kind of corporation, and it was in the first instance this 
corporation that dissolved. But of course the dissolution of this legal-political structure also 
brought wide-reaching changes in other relations of power and practical activity. Still, many 
institutions that had been knit together through the Soviet state continued to exist with 
varying degrees of change in its absence. The city of Moscow had a legal and institutional 
status in the Soviet Union and a not completely dissimilar one in the successor Russian 
federation and republic. Gazprom changed more. Its creation in 1989 restructured the legal 
status and operating organization of the pre-existing Russian gas industry. But after the 
dissolution of the USSR, Gazprom was privatized in 1992 and has since operated as a joint-
stock company. It was subjected to asset-stripping in the 1990s, then partially reintegrated 
and brought under state control in the first decade of the 2000s. In similar fashion one could 
trace a long list of partial continuities and partial transformations.  
 
Nonetheless, Derluguian’s  account  of  how  the USSR could be treated as stable and 
obviously enduring almost to the moment it reached its end is instructive. It is a mistake to 
view the future only in terms of linear projections without considering possible sharp 
discontinuities. Derluguian reminds us of how pressures can build up to make a system both 
hard to sustain and vulnerable to small actions and events that have large consequences 
because of the unstable integration of the whole. He reminds us also that even a large 
structure that has come to be taken for granted as providing the basic context and conditions 
for the rest of life can be much more mutable than its surface continuity suggests. But we 
should recognize that the Soviet Union was not equivalent to socialism and thereby somehow 
directly analogous to capitalism. It was something more particular and of a different order.  
 
This is so whether we treat capitalism as a set of practices that can be undertaken by 
capitalists anywhere, or as an economic system that knits together enterprises, markets, 
investments, and labor throughout the world. Capitalism is a historical formation, grounded as 
Michael Mann would say in a set of power networks. It has existed for the last 400 years 
primarily in the form of the modern world-system that Immanuel Wallerstein has analyzed. 
This is a hierarchical and unequally integrated organization in which the primary units are 
nation-states and economic actors are crucially dependent on relations with and conditions 
provided by political power.  
 
To be sure, the idea of a nation-state is in a sense aspirational; the suturing of socio-
cultural identity to governmental institutions is never perfect; economic integration can itself 
advance national integration and certainly economic actors also influence government. Yet 
even if partially a fiction, the nation-state is a crucial formal unit for participation in global 
affairs, reproduced in political isomorphism. Most international organizations are literally that 
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– structured by nationally organized participation. And states organized in this way provide 
crucial underpinnings to capitalism. They provide the legal and monetary bases for both firms 
and markets. They manage, or provide settings for the management of interdependence 
among different firms, industries, and sectors. By organizing structures of cultural and social 
belonging, however imperfectly, and sometimes by regulating markets, they organize 
workforces, consumer markets,  and  trust.  The  term  “nation-state”  may  be  only  shorthand  for  
“efforts  to  organize  politics  and  socio-cultural belonging in terms of nation-states”  but  the  era  
of capitalism and the era of nation-states have been one and the same. There is no “real”  
capitalism, no matter how global, that  isn’t  conditioned  by this political-economic and socio-
cultural organization. The import of this is that existing capitalist prosperity and sustainability 
depend on nation-states and institutional affordances they have provided. These must be 
renewed or replaced. Yet, for 40 years the OECD countries have turned away from this task. 
Instead  they  have  hollowed  out  the  “welfare  state”  institutions  of  the  past,  reducing  costs  and  
pursuing immediate competitiveness but neglecting the long-term well-being and security of 
their populations and the collective investment that enables future economic participation.  
 
That said, most of the old capitalist countries of Europe or European settlement are 
not at the point of immediate collapse.  Britain’s  National  Health  Service  still  works,  though  
costs are rising and threaten national budgets. The US has actually, very belatedly, improved 
health provision (particularly addressing the large number of people who do not get health 
benefits from their jobs). And so forth. There has been great erosion. National budgets are in 
deficit and do not allow for easy rebuilding. But it is not necessarily too late to get houses in 
order. A wakeup call comes from those European economies that face such dire fiscal crises 
that they can only cut support for their citizens – precisely at a moment when they need it 
urgently. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus have teetered on the brink and 
others may. But this threatens the European Union more than capitalism as such. 
 
Capitalism could swing further and further out of equilibrium. This might represent 
the  irreversible  “bifurcation”  of  a  quasi-natural system (as Wallerstein has it, following 
Prigogine) or the failures of regulation, corporate strategy and investor prudence in a chaotic 
capital markets or indeed simply weak institutional coordination among dispersed and 
differently interested actors. It could represent a failure to distribute wealth widely enough to 
create demand for enhanced productivity, one possible consequence of the decline in job 
creation Collins envisages (though the political consequences of unemployment may be more 
immediate). Whatever the underlying dynamics, loss of a stable equilibrium increases the 
costs of trying to hold the capitalism together, heightens political strains, and produces social 
tensions. This kind of disequilibrium is one way of interpreting what crises mean, and the 
greater the disequilibrium the more difficult and expensive the action required to restore 
equilibrium.   
 
Nonetheless, I think capitalism is not likely to collapse. It may lose some of its grip 
on the course of social change. It may organize less of social, economic, and political life. But 
the image of collapse is misleading. To say the Roman Empire collapsed is meaningful, but it 
is worth noting that it took over 200 years, not just a single crisis. To say feudalism collapsed 
and in the process gave birth to modern capitalism – the schema offered in The Communist 
Manifesto – is  less  realistic.  First,  feudalism  was  not  “systemic”  in  quite  the  sense  modern  
capitalism is. But second, there was no moment of the collapse of feudal relations or related 
institutions. The long decline in feudal relations came in an era of state-building and war, of 
agricultural innovation and growing global commerce, of religious revitalization and 
Reformation – and it lasted at least 300 years. It was not simply a collapse. The Catholic 
Church was deeply transformed during the era when feudalism declined, and never played the 
same role afterwards, but it survived. Many monarchies disappeared, though not all; some 
managed transformations enough to remain – and sometimes remain significant – in an era 
that could hardly be called feudal.  
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The end of the capitalist era, if and when it comes, is likely to be comparably rough, 
uneven, and hard to discern in mid-process. There will be institutions that survive it, 
including  quite  possibly  many  business  corporations,  which  needn’t  stop  trading, 
manufacturing, or speculating just because capitalism stops being the driving force of the age. 
The effort to buy cheap and sell dear long predated capitalism and likely will last long after.  
 
 
Capitalism in general and finance-dominated capitalism in particular 
 
 Capitalism creates a variety of problems for itself, for human society, and for nature. 
But  for  the  most  part  these  problems  don’t  drive  capitalism  into  potentially  fatal  tailspins.  
Extreme financialization does produce such vulnerability.  
 
 Finance is of course a basic part of capitalism, providing it with dynamism, capacity 
for rapid expansion, and tools for managing costs over time. It has been crucial to 
technological revolutions. More generally, it is central to the basic, definitive ability to move 
capital from one investment to another based on anticipated greater profits.  
 
As its name suggests, capitalism is centrally a way of organizing economic activity 
through the fluid deployment of wealth – capital – by means of investments in different kinds 
of profit-making enterprises. Capital is invested or investable wealth. Finance – including 
straightforward debt but also a range of tradable securities - is an important part of this, 
crucial to the liquidity and mobility of capital as well as to expansion and spreading costs 
over time. Entrepreneurial dynamism depends on financial backing. But lopsided 
financialization can be distorting in a variety of ways. It brought dramatic increases in 
domestic income inequality in all the major capitalist economies; it channeled funds away 
from investment in productive enterprises. It fueled a  long  “megabubble”  in asset prices, 
including the more specific bubble in mortgage-backed housing prices that helped precipitate 
the 2008-9 crisis. It encouraged speculation. 
 
During the years before the 2008-9 market crisis, trading in equities and debt 
overtook employment-generating and profit-sharing industries in the old core of the capitalist 
world-system. Where financial instruments accounted for only a quarter of invested assets in 
the 1970s, by 2008 financialization had brought the total to 75%. Globally, financial assets 
accounted for some 4 times the value of all equities and 10 times total global GDP.  
 
This was a global phenomenon, shaped by a range of factors largely dating from the 
1970s and accelerating toward the end of the 20th century. Because of its unpopularity, the US 
financed the last years of the Vietnam War largely on credit. Seeking to manage economic 
difficulties in the 1970s, the US and other core capitalist countries brought the Bretton Woods 
monetary system to an end, replacing the stabilization of backing by precious metals with 
floating, infinitely tradable fiat currencies. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war OPEC oil 
producers restricted supply, vastly multiplying their returns from a world deeply dependent 
on petroleum and then channeled much of the money into sovereign wealth funds. But 
financialization  was  at  its  most  extreme  in  the  world’s  longstanding  core  capitalist  economies  
(and weaker economies yoked to them, for example by membership in the European Union). 
And while it was led by big capital it also drew in ordinary citizens who saw their incomes 
stagnate but continued high levels of spending by relying on credit. A better balance between 
productive industrial enterprise and finance is in fact one of the advantages of today’s  higher  
growth economies like China or India as they move from semi-periphery to core in global 
capitalism.  
The recent financial crisis reveals the main internal vulnerability of capitalism. This 
is systemic risk – that is, risks embedded in the complex web of internal connections that 
make up the modern financial system. It is important to be clear about this and about the 
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nature  of  the  crisis.  This  was  not  a  “classic”  capitalist  crisis  of  overproduction  and  
underconsumption. While it had a wide range  of  impacts  in  the  “real”  economy  of  
manufacturing and consumption, it was first and foremost a financial crisis. Its impact was 
multiplied by the enormous growth in global finance during the decades preceding, and 
especially the extent to which financial assets came to dominate especially in advanced 
Western economies. It was this that made overleveraging, excessive risk-taking, poor or 
absent regulation, and the heavy use and abuse of a range of new financial technologies so 
dangerous and ultimately so damaging. Not only did financialization increase the scale of 
financial assets, thus increasing the impact of a financial crisis. In addition and more basically, 
it increased the interconnection of capitalist institutions joined not only in more or less 
transparent market transactions but also in a host of complicated and often opaque financial 
relationships. This was particularly true of the financial industry. When major banks were 
described in 2008-9  as  “too  big  to  fail”  it  might  have  been  more  accurate  to say: “too  
connected  to  fail”.  But  financialization  did  not  only  affect  firms  in  the  financial  sector;;  it  
became a basic part of all large-scale global capitalism. Car companies became auto-finance 
companies. Mining companies were tied centrally to exchange-rate arbitrage. 
Financialization  enhances  the  dynamism  of  capitalism.  It  facilitates  the  “creative  
destruction”  of  existing  structures  of  capital  (e.g.,  specific  modes  of  industrial  production)  
and spurs the development of new technologies, products, production processes, and sites of 
production. When extreme, though, it drives investments towards ever more short-term profits 
and undercuts long-term and deeper growth. It also produces speculative bubbles and busts. It 
increases market pressure on firms bringing less than median returns to capital, driving 
disinvestment from still-profitable older businesses and thus driving down wages and 
reducing the tendency of industrial capitalism to share profits through rising wages. It 
intensifies inequality.  
 
Financialization leads to returns on invested wealth that far outstrip returns on 
productive employment. It rewards traders more than material producers (and despite 
celebrated exceptions, far more than most entrepreneurs). It makes all other sorts of 
businesses pay more for financial services. The 2010 bonus pool for securities industry 
employees in New York City alone was $20.8 billion; the top 25 hedge fund managers earned 
$22.7 billion. And this was after the market meltdown revealed the damage financialization 
was doing to the larger economy. As an organization of wealth production, this does much 
less for the larger economy – or society – than most forms of industry. 
 
While technological obsolescence and spatial reorganization are both general features 
of capitalist growth, they are accelerated by financialization. Financialization increases the 
rate at which investments move from old to new industries and old to new locations. The 
result of this is not only technological and economic change, but also human displacement. 
Rapid urbanization in developing countries and decaying industrial cities in older core 
countries are two sides of the same process. With declining profits in manufacturing, 
European and American companies in a range of industries responded by demanding that 
workers take cuts in compensation, introducing new technologies, insisting that governments 
provide tax breaks or outright subsidies, and/or relocating of manufacturing to other countries. 
Sometimes relocation came even after corporations benefitted from subsidies and wage cuts, 
in defiance of commitments to stay put. Neoliberal governments aided corporations in 
breaking the power of unions to resist these changes. This brought the loss of good jobs that 
Collins sees as a long-term threat, but the reasons were not all technological. Financial capital 
enabled the rapid relocation of industrial production.  
 
Fluid financial resources also fuel asset price bubbles. The long, international real 
estate boom of the late 20th century is an example. This brought dramatic housing price 
increases, especially in cities and tourist areas. This often added to economic imbalance and 
produced other distortions, but crucially it knit real estate and construction, the personal 
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savings of homeowners and the once-prudent operations of local banks into a gigantic 
international system. It was this linkage that generated the systemic risk that led to crisis in 
2008-9. 
 
This systemic risk was enhanced by new techniques in financial engineering and 
investment. Hedge funds and derivatives took on central economic roles, aided by failures of 
regulation. Basically this meant developing a host of new financial instruments, many of them 
knitting different economic actors together in a web of mutual obligations like debt and 
insurance, and attracting unprecedented amounts of money to those new sorts of investments 
and deploying this money in trades largely hidden from public view. A host of seemingly 
stable local assets – like home mortgages – were bundled into securities traded globally by 
investors unable to assess their underlying quality. Even though many of the new instruments 
were designed to reduce risk and make capitalism more predictable, they became objects of 
largely speculative trading. Risk became more concentrated and dangerous. It became harder 
for specific firms to know how much they were exposed and to whom.  
 
Derivatives – essentially securities based on bets about the eventual price of an 
underlying asset –were used as insurance to offset other risky investments. They also became 
high risk but potentially high-payoff investments, not least by hedge funds. By the 1990s, 
capital  in  such  “alternative”  investments  has  passed  $50  trillion  and  it  reached  about  $600  
trillion by the 2008 crisis. This may have encouraged fund managers and other investors to 
believe risk had been tamed, but recurrent failures of hedging suggest otherwise. Sudden 
liquidity shortages and political actions could trigger massive failures. This was well known 
in advance of the most recent crisis. As Raghuran Rajan, former IMF chief economist, 
remarked  in  light  of  the  Russian  government  debt  default  in  1998:  “A  hedged  position  can  
become unhedged at the worst time, inflicting substantial losses on those who mistakenly 
believe they are protected.” 
 
Completely eliminating these problems would end capitalism as we know it. We 
would no longer have capitalism if capital could not be moved among investments seeking 
greater return, and absent the demand for reinvestment in pursuit of greater productivity that 
drives innovation and accumulation. Regulation that attempted this would undercut 
dynamism and wealth creation. On the other hand, some level of regulation combined with 
well-organized government spending may be crucial to recovery and resilience. And 
economies with more widespread entrepreneurship may fare better than those that remain 
dominated by finance capital. In any case, it is sobering to consider that regulatory 
improvements since the financial crisis began have been minimal. Almost nothing has been 
done to reduce the potential for systemic risk. 
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Thinking from the crisis 
 
In March 2008 stock markets plummeted; retirement savings were wiped out. Major 
banks failed, especially in Britain and the US. Other banks were judged  “too  large  to  fail”  (in 
a process we now know to be partly a matter of insider-dealing between corporate executives 
and the government). They were bailed out on a massive scale, turning public revenues not 
only into a compensation for private risk-taking but also a direct source of private wealth. 
Some industrial companies were also kept alive by bailouts but by far the largest subsidies 
went to the finance industry where they were turned directly into capital without passing 
through the circuits of job creation or relief for homeowners struggling against foreclosure. 
Had governments not provided this support it is possible capitalist financial markets would 
have spiraled much further down, still more deeply damaging global capitalism.  
 
The US made enormous countercyclical investments both in infrastructure and in 
direct subsidies to the financial industry (yet possibly not as large as were required). Britain 
chose a program of fiscal austerity by imposing even more cutbacks on itself than credit 
markets  demanded.  And  Europe’s  North  – especially Germany – imposed austerity on its 
South, bringing the European Union near to a breaking point. 
 
Continental Europeans thought their institutions had weathered the crisis better than 
those of Anglophones until the public finances of several EU member states began to collapse 
under strain. Banking bailouts, especially in Southern Europe turned crisis of the private for-
profit financial industry into a fiscal crisis of states. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain all 
teetered on the brink of bankruptcy even after severe austerity programs had been imposed. 
Financial crisis exposed weaknesses in the very constitution of the EU and the Eurozone – 
which were, in large part, products of the era of financialization. Intensified global 
competition seemed to call for a larger Europe to compete effectively with China and the US 
– a logic not dissimilar to that which led Citigroup and the Royal Bank of Scotland in their 
rushes to expansion. The desire for a common currency – attractive to financial and business 
leaders in Europe – had led to its introduction without mechanisms for common financial 
governance or in general the political institutions to back it up. The European Central Bank 
was governed by a board representing different national governments with competing 
interests. Different countries pursued different fiscal policies and practices. And as the EU 
expanded beyond its original core states, European integration linked very disparate 
economies. Commitments to redistribution that were tacitly tolerated in years of growth 
became points of contention in the midst of crisis.  
 
The futures of the Euro and the Eurozone remain uncertain. Spain and Portugal have 
gained minimal stability only for Italy to wobble and Cypus enter a tailspin. No one knows 
how far the European crisis will spread: perhaps to old member Belgium or new member 
Slovenia, perhaps to the EU itself, endangering the very common currency agreement. 
Meanwhile, austerity programs seek macroeconomic rectitude by rolling back state provision 
of services and security. In varying combinations cutbacks were national self-imposed, 
responses to market pressures, and the result of external imposition not unlike the structural 
adjustment policies the IMF demanded of debt-ridden Third World countries in the 1980s. 
States are harnessed to save investors from losses and global markets from deep depression. 
Though it was investors and the transnational financial industry that reaped the huge profits of 
the bubble era and most directly benefitted from bailouts and government-provided liquidity 
the crisis and remedial actions are discussed in terms of nation-states. Of course, trying to 
grasp all this as a matter of profligate Greeks and prudent Germans obscures the central role 
of financialization itself (and of course the construction of the financial crisis narrative in 
overwhelmingly national terms reinforces other aspects of nationalist ideology, including 
increasingly widespread xenophobia and especially Islamophobia). Profits made by financial 
institutions encouraged the European Union to expand and to turn a blind eye to fiscal 
problems in member states. Now the citizens of EU countries with stronger banks and balance 
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sheets complain about having to bail out other nations, straining the European Union itself, 
and forgetting the extent to which the benefits of bailout went to the financial industry and 
those with large capital assets. 
 
Even  after  massive  infusions  of  taxpayers’  money,  European  and  American  financial  
institutions  remain  shaky.  Some  had  to  take  a  “haircut”  on  loans  made  in  high-risk markets; 
only intergovernmental finance has held off collapse. Almost all face a continuing effort to 
strengthen their balance sheets after ill-considered expansion during the bubble. But stock 
markets have regained much of what they lost. Initial public offerings are again producing 
profits (and again for a mixture of firms with serious products and profitability and those with 
little more than hopes and image). Investment banks and other firms have resumed paying big 
bonuses, thus renewing one of the incentives to excessive risk-taking (though more now pay 
bonuses  in  corporate  stock  and  ban  its  immediately  sale  in  order  to  tie  employees’  interests  to  
the  firm’s  well-being).  But  some  are  also  laying  off  employees  in  recognition  of  “excess  
capacity”  and  fears  of  return  to  recession  are serious. Regulatory reform has been minimal, 
leaving derivatives markets far from transparent and allowing massive leverage against 
modest assets. Banking is even more concentrated in a few giant firms than before the crisis. 
Housing prices remain low, and in some places are falling again after the seeming to stabilize. 
Credit remains tight; interests rates are virtually nil.  
 
The  “real  economy”  remains  depressed  – if  not  quite  “in  depression”.  Growth  in  GDP  
is low; unemployment remains high; new job creation  recurrently  fails  to  meet  analysts’  
expectations. Yet anxieties about inflation and government debt lead some to argue that the 
pursuit of growth must be foregone in favor of fiscal austerity. The fiscal position of many 
US states is almost as bleak as that of Greece or Spain, and though the federal government 
has fiscal tools states lack, it faces massive deficits without an agreement on a budget to cut 
or finance them in any combination. Economic discontent is a primary factor in widespread 
and deep political discontent with populist anger at corrupt, self-serving or incompetent 
government linked to both more conventionally right wing and left wing ideologies. 
Weakened political legitimacy is a challenge to the continuity of capitalism. 
 
But the developing European path seems to be neither collapse nor revolution but 
rather stagnation. Europe lacks growth, but still enjoys a relatively high standard of living and 
basically functional economic systems. There are goods in the shops (though more and more 
shops close). Most governments pay their bills (though they continue to cut expenditures). 
The dominant policy response has been austerity, the attempt to overcome deficits in state 
accounts. As this has little positive effect, however prudent in the abstract and long-term, 
politicians look more and more for growth but so far find few palatable mechanisms to 
produce it.  
 
Having failed to address its financial problems as a Union, Europe faces a series of 
nationally structured fiscal crises. Yet there remain enough economic strength and political 
will in the EU to bail out banks and financial markets in each case. There is widespread 
popular discontent but so far no large-scale social movements challenging existing political 
parties or processes. Huge rallies and sometimes occupations in public squares signal the 
unhappiness  but  so  far  haven’t  found  a  way  to  turn  this  to  new  political  programs  rather  than  
only objections to old. Right wing populists have seized the moment with anti-immigrant and 
other reactionary programs, but even though they have seen ominous growth so far they 
remain fringe movements, their biggest effect being to pull mainstream conservative parties 
to  the  right.  Europe’s  Left  is  barely  visible unless one counts basically self-interested strikes 
and statist manifestoes in France. What has instead emerged is rather a series of essentially 
“anti-political”  movements,  exemplified  by  Italy’s  Five  Star  movement  under  Beppe  Grillo  
but echoed in other countries where citizens vote not for more effective government but 
against government and especially politicians. Popular response to economic crisis and weak 
government legitimacy has often included right wing and xenophobic agitations.  
 9 
 
The US tried more pro-growth stimulus and is being rewarded with modest economic 
improvement: perhaps 2 or 2.5% growth by 2013 – vastly  better  than  Europe’s  0  to  1%  but  
nothing to cheer about. US prospects are improved at least temporarily by new energy 
resources and longer-term by a more  entrepreneurial  economy.  But  the  country’s  dynamism  is  
undercut by a deadlocked political process. While the Tea Party is now organized electorally 
mainly as a wing of the Republic Party, its roots are much more anti-political – not unlike 
Italy’s  Five Star movement. Its legacy pulls the Republican Right not towards different 
solutions so much as a resistance to compromises and thus to all available political options. 
The Obama administration is mostly technocratic centrist, though making its major policy 
innovations on a handful of liberal issues. But it has been unable to bring about a major 
reorientation in the wake of the crisis. In finance the same organizations remain dominant and 
pursue agendas largely similar to before the crisis. Some of the biggest threats to the US 
economy lie in deficit-ridden state and municipal governments. Cost-cutting at these levels 
reduces the impact of federal stimulus spending, but more basically state and local 
governments face long-term obligations that could spell fiscal collapse unless a combination 
of growth and inflation reduces the burden. 
 
Though the roots of the 2008 crisis were centered in the US and the EU, its effects 
have been worldwide. The dense interconnections and rapid flows of global capitalism and 
global media made it seem immediately obvious that the crisis was simply global. This was 
half fact and half illusion, or perhaps, a distortion based on perspective. The roiling of capital 
markets did have far-flung effects. Plunging asset prices damaged sovereign wealth funds in 
Abu Dhabi and nearly bankrupted its neighboring emirate, Dubai. Exacerbated 
unemployment – especially among youth - may have helped to spark the so-called Arab 
Spring (though clearly the economic crisis can be no more than part of a more complex story). 
Stock markets in Shanghai, Tokyo, and Johannesburg sank with those in New York and 
London, though they regained ground much faster. Factory workers in China and Vietnam 
were laid off with sagging global demand, though after faltering briefly the Chinese and 
Vietnamese economies kept growing. Prices for energy and other natural resources became 
extremely volatile. After first falling dramatically, they recovered on demand from still 
growing economies like China, then in some cases sagged again as the Chinese economy did 
the same.  
 
For a time, even as the US struggled to escape a double-dip recession and Europe 
struggled with the sovereign debt of several member states, China, India and several other 
developing countries maintained rapid growth. Indeed, Chinese policy-makers’  biggest 
concern  through  2011  was  not  an  economic  downturn,  per  se,  but  rather  “overheating”  in  
which economic growth outstripped supplies of raw materials, labor, and other inputs and 
brought hard-to-harness inflation. Since China had become one of the biggest creditors of the 
United States, it (like other foreign investors) had to worry about the value of its dollar-
denominated assets as well as about markets for its export goods. At writing, Chinese growth 
continues at a rate that would thrill Europeans, but has slowed rapidly proving China is not 
immune from the global downturn. The overheated financial markets pose one challenge. 
Thousands of apartments sit empty in Beijing and Shanghai, bought by speculators hoping to 
sell  them  again  quickly.  If  growth  doesn’t pick up soon, or worse, falls much below 5%, this 
real estate bubble could burst bringing a downward spiral as overleveraged owners unload 
their holdings. This is a relatively local and contained example of systemic risk, but there are 
others on a much larger scale where highly leveraged financial markets are highly 
interconnected with each other. This is also  one  factor  making  China’s leaders fear domestic 
discord.  
 
In India, capitalism is comparably vital, more entrepreneurial, and less tied to central 
government. The last is a blessing, because central government is considerably less effective. 
India has more endemic poverty and a less developed infrastructure. Its growth has been 
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substantial, but has recently slowed perhaps due to local inefficiencies and a poor system for 
international investment, though it seems to face less threat from speculative bubbles. Like 
China, though, its economic and political efficiency weakened by widespread corruption. And 
like China it faces widespread ecological-environmental problems (though not yet anything 
like  China’s  air  pollution  disaster).  More  open  to  autonomous  institutions,  India  has  a  more  
substantial range of philanthropic efforts to mitigate risk and alleviate poverty. But it faces 
massive inequality, and rapid urbanization presents this in newly challenging forms. State 
institutions to support those without the resources for market solutions remain modest. 
 
Happily growth has also continued in much of Africa and in some of the emerging 
markets of Asia and Latin America. After years of being snubbed by the EU, Turkey now has 
a growth rate the envy of Europe. But many economies throughout the world are, at best, 
unsettled and global capitalist expansion is close to stalled. This exposes as illusion the notion 
that the BRICS and other emerging markets would simply carry on capitalist expansion 
without interruption – or  in  other  words,  that  the  crisis  was  entirely  local  to  the  world’s  richer  
economies. It was a global crisis and it is embedded in the globalization capitalism has helped 
to produce. That said, of course it did not have the same implications everywhere. The crisis 
speeded up the transfer of global economic power to China (and in varying degree other 
“emerging”  economies)  that  had  begun  as  a  dimension  of  the  financialization  of  the  world’s  
richer industrial economies. Ironically, this closed the gap between rich and poor countries 
more than the pro-development policies and assistance of the earlier decades of industrial 
boom. Long-term growth has not made China immune to the global downtown and other 
“BRICS”  have  seen  much  greater  volatility  (like  Russia)  or  sharper  slowdowns  (like  Brazil).  
 
Still, the bottom line is that capitalism is not likely to end as a result of any economic 
crisis alone. It is the intersection of economic with political crises that threatens it most, or the 
erosion of the implicit bargain in which people accept damages to society or environment in 
the pursuit of growth. Europe raises the spectre of no growth capitalism – almost a 
contradiction in terms – and  it’s  not  clear  how  it  will  cope.  Asia  seems  still  to  offer  growth,  
but in combination with volatile and vulnerable politics. And political unrest is recurrent, both where faltering growth brings disappointment to those with rising expectations and where elected leaders seek to diminish public freedoms and quash dissent. 
 
Though the capitalist era has been shaped by the notion that an imagined pure 
economy was sharply differentiated from state and civil society, capitalism itself has always 
been and must be produced in practices and organizations that cross those boundaries. The 
relationship between states and economic activity is constitutive not incidental. Capitalism 
depends  not  only  on  the  organization  of  markets  as  “objective”  systemic  phenomena  but  also  
on social and cultural constructions like the corporation – not just as a legal entity but as an 
organization of work. The expansion of capitalism has not only depended on states and 
societies, but on the exploitation of nature. In each of these three cases, capitalism is 
destructive of conditions on which capitalism depends – and extreme financialization and 
neoliberalism exacerbate this tendency. The future survival of capitalism depends on whether 
ways can be found to limit or reverse this destruction without eliminating capitalism.  
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Institutional deficits 
 
 One can feel transformation and renewal underway in much of Asia and parts of 
Africa and Latin America. High growth rates make for widespread optimism about a capitalist 
future  and  even  encourage  governments  to  join  activists  in  declaring  commitments  to  “green 
growth”  and  the  building  of  better  social  support  systems.  The  contrast  with  austerity-plagued 
Europe and the politically deadlocked and only slightly faster growing US is palpable. Yet 
there is a crucial similarity despite differences of mood and trajectory.  
Capitalist growth has imposed enormous costs in pollution, social upheaval, and 
inequality. The appropriation of disproportionate wealth by a capitalist elite is manifest, even 
flaunted, though so far enough others have shared in development to mute protest. Corruption 
adds a further challenge on top of inequality. At the same time, huge investments in 
infrastructure and resources are demanded, both for industry itself and to house rapidly 
urbanizing populations. These costs are largely externalized, while the new wealth is 
appropriated by those able to own, command salaries from, or tax capitalist profits. That is, 
the environmental and social costs are not borne by charges on corporate balance sheets; 
moreover, governments pick up much of the bill for needed infrastructural investments.  
 So is it ever with capitalism. It depends on  an  “externalization  regime”  that  enables 
its enterprises to rely on states, non-profit organizations, and indeed families and ordinary 
people generally to bear the costs of both enabling conditions like infrastructure and damages 
inflicted as by-products of capitalist growth. Indeed,  much  of  capitalism’s  profitability  and  
growth depends on externalizing costs. Firms seldom pay in full for public investments from 
which they benefit - like health care, educating workers or building needed infrastructure. 
They produce pollution and waste but do not shoulder the financial, human, or natural costs 
of the damage. Capitalism generates terrific wealth, in other words, but it does it always with 
the byproduct of severe “illth” (to use the term coined by John Ruskin in polluted and 
poverty-stricken 19th Century England). It can continue to generate the wealth only as long as 
the illth is tolerated. States try to manage the trade-off, but taxing capitalism adequately to 
pay for its own costs undercuts their international competitiveness and potentially eliminates 
capitalism’s  very  wealth-generating dynamism.  
Capitalist enterprises also derive a number of other benefits from states, ranging from 
defense of their property claims to opportunities to harness for private commercialization the 
products of government-funded research. States provide needed inputs from currencies to 
roads and security in such matters as contract law. Capitalism also depends on social 
solidarity and a range of institutions from schools to health care. These often provide 
opportunities to profit, even when they are partially organized on public or non-profit bases. 
But more basically, they provide services that enterprises would otherwise need to internalize 
and a stable context for business.  
Indeed, even business corporations are not altogether contained within or controlled 
by capitalism as an economic system; they are legally structured, enmeshed in politics, and do 
work for their members beyond the profits for their owners. Corporate employment has been 
a major source of welfare benefits including pensions and health care insurance, though this 
has been in decline during the era of extreme financialization as companies subject to 
disinvestment or takeover bids lost ability to plan for the long-term and pared expenses to 
make their profitability more immediate to please fickle financial markets. Even more 
important  in  mitigating  life’s  risks  – including those produced or intensified by capitalism – 
are governmental institutions from health to education to care for the aged and support for the 
unemployed. Many of these have been subjected to debilitating pressures during the era of 
financialization. At the same time, older institutions like family, community, and religious 
organizations are able to pick up only some of the additional burden. There are newly created 
nonprofit organizations founded both for self-help and as charities. For those with money to 
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pay there are other approaches to managing risk, from insurance to savings. But as an 
economic system that inescapably produces risk and volatility capitalism depends on some 
structure of supporting institutions to help ordinary people cope. There has already been sharp 
erosion in socially organized mitigation of risks in longstanding capitalist economies and 
relatively slow development of new institutions for this purpose in emerging capitalist 
economies. This in turn raises questions about whether capitalism, and governments that 
support it, can sustain political legitimacy. 
Capitalism has flourished – and secured widespread legitimacy - on the basis of 
institutions and social relations that have been damaged in recent decades; its renewal will 
depend on their renewal. This is partly a matter of providing for legitimacy, social solidarity, 
and social support. It is also a matter of dealing with the fact that capitalist growth is at the 
same time a matter of urbanization, resource demands, environmental degradation, migration 
and a host of other issues – not simply investment, production and profit. The capacity to deal 
with these comes not just from markets but governments and indeed a wide range of social 
institutions. As Karl Polanyi argued in the midst of 20th century depression and war, looking 
back at the 19th century as well as forward, unbridled capitalist development always 
undermines the social conditions of its own survival as well as the greater good; efforts to 
build new institutional supports can both stabilize the capitalist system and underpin more 
effective sharing of the benefits of capitalist growth. 
An implicit social contract underwrites the legitimacy not just of capitalist enterprise 
but also of the states that provide for its continuity: citizens tolerate inequality and the 
externalization of long-term  costs  in  return  for  growth.  Today’s  high-growth countries in Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa all face serious challenges producing balance enough in their 
growth patterns to maintain national cohesion and investment in the conditions of future 
growth. They will not obviously be able to sustain recent growth rates, especially in a low-
growth global economy, and absent such growth they will face both bursting speculative 
bubbles and citizen discontent.  
 Europe and the US face the same challenges without the benefit of optimism or 
growth. Anxiety about the long absence of economic growth and manifest political weakness 
dealing with this is palpable, but so far has not produced a social movement response capable 
of really shaping the likely outcomes. Popular response to economic crisis and weak government legitimacy has come largely in right-wing and often xenophobic agitations.Government response in Europe is a debilitating effort to restore state fiscal 
balances by austerity programs while preserving the capital of those who were the primary 
beneficiaries of financialization and precipitators of crisis. The US has done more to stimulate 
renewed growth, but suffers from political deadlocks as well as the same determination that 
costs should be borne by taxpayers at large more than by financial institutions or their 
investors.  
During eras of sustained and substantial growth, especially following the Second 
World War, capitalism generated employment and improving pay. At the same time, 
economic growth underwrote expansions in health-care, education, transportation, and other 
benefits in which citizens widely shared on the basis of progressive taxation and government 
investments. Now, citizens doubt their children will enjoy greater prosperity or opportunity 
than they do. The desire of citizens in rich countries to get richer is confronted by their 
countries’  need  to  remain  internationally  competitive  (not  just  for  trade,  but  to  command the 
allegiance of elites and corporations that may flee high tax regimes). There are good reasons 
to expect growth rates in the old rich capitalist core countries to lag global growth so even if 
they remain rich, improvements will be reduced absent major structural reform. At the same 
time, institutional structures that long ensured the overall legitimacy of capitalism have been 
eroded since the 1970s and more sharply in the context of financial and fiscal crisis. 
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The  term  “neoliberalism”  is  used  to  refer to a package of policies that sought 
simultaneously to reduce government costs and active participation in economic activity and 
to reduce government regulation of capitalist markets. This post-1970s liberalism owed much 
to 19th century liberalism. A central difference is that the later version sought to unravel a host 
of social protections and economic arrangements put in place as part of mature capitalism. Its 
major targets were institutional arrangements put in place in response to the Great Depression 
and in the long postwar boom. But the link to 19th century liberalism is instructive, for it 
reminds us to recognize that the tension between pursuit  of  “unfettered”  capitalism  and  the  
effort  to  compensate  for  capitalism’s  limits  and  excesses  is  an  old  one. In the 19th century, 
liberals often sought to dismantle traditional institutions that got in the way of capitalist 
profits as well as to limit new ones. And this is an issue throughout the developing world 
today.  
 
In China, for example, the development of highly dynamic capitalism is in tension 
with longstanding local community structures as well as alternative institutions put in place 
during the communist era – like the danwei which  made  a  “work  unit”  the  central  provider  of  
housing, health care, and employment (with certain similarities to paternalistic company 
towns in an earlier phase of Western capitalist development). Workers taking new jobs, 
especially those migrating to new jobs in fast growing urban regions, are stripped of both 
older forms of social capital in their communities of origin and the institutional provisions 
once offered by the danwei. They make new ways of life in cities, doing well to the extent 
that they have money to purchase market substitutes for the older forms of provision and 
struggling  more  when  they  don’t.  Sometimes they create new social institutions for 
themselves, much as migrants to cities such as Shanghai a generation ago created native place 
and clanship associations. Often they live somewhat marginal existences, trying to save 
money either to send home or to bring families. The government attempts to regulate this 
process, for example using the houkou system  to  restrict  unauthorized  migrants’  access  to  
urban institutions like schools. The very existence of the restriction is evidence of the 
institutional deficit as much as a tool of social control.  
 
As China develops further in a capitalist direction, however, it needs stronger 
institutions. The government is indeed expanding education and restructuring health care, not 
least through introducing a new system of primary care. There are anxieties about what 
institutions will provide care for the elderly in a rapidly aging society (with family provision 
undercut not just by changing attitudes but by labor migration and the one-child family 
policy).  One may only speculate at what may develop to provide unemployment protection 
or social services. The new institutions could be charitable undertakings or mutual benefit 
societies, though so far the government has been reluctant to allow either much autonomy. It 
seems clearly to be following a capitalist path but it is unclear how much this will involve a 
replication of Western institutions, an emulation of the Western neoliberalism that tries to 
minimize such institutions, or some variety of  state  capitalism  (“with  Chinese  
characteristics”).   
 
State capitalism has been an exception during the last 450 years, but one possible 
transformation of capitalism would be for it to grow more common. Arguably Soviet 
communism already involved something like state capitalism. Certainly fascism did. Where 
governments today use reactionary nationalism to shore up their legitimacy, state capitalism 
seems more likely. The key point is that future capitalism need not be an extension of the 
“liberal  capitalism”  dominant  in  the  last  two  centuries  of  Western  history.  The widely 
remarked link between capitalism and liberal democracy may turn out to have been only one 
way of relating capitalism to politics, shaped by particular historical conditions and struggles.  
 
Of course domestic neoliberalism was closely related to the international promotion 
of  “free  trade”. Reduction of tariffs and other trade regulation is in a sense similar to reducing 
restrictions on internal mobility and government efforts to shape markets. Providing military 
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security (or advantage) and delivering social security converge with the perceived advantages 
of state-dominated capital investment and buffers against global markets to make it a 
plausible model. This is particularly likely in countries with little experience of liberal 
democracy. Of course, Western states have also run business ventures – especially in 
transportation, communication, and power industries - but these have seldom been organized 
for purposes of capital accumulation as distinct from compensating for market failures. It was 
a hallmark of neoliberalism to demand their privatization, and this has been extensive – not 
only in old core economies like Britain but in a number of developing countries, notably in 
Latin America. In any case, it remains an open question whether the characteristic 
institutional structure for capitalism moving forward will distinguish government, business 
institutions, and civil society from each other as sharply as has been the case in the West.  
 
 
Scarce resources and degraded nature 
 
Continued capital accumulation is limited not only by internal economic difficulties 
and problems in the reproduction of its social and political support-systems, but also by 
destruction  of  its  “natural”  environment.  Capitalism  depends  on  raw  materials,  on the 
sustenance of a human population, and on the willingness of humans organized in different 
societies to tolerate the externalization of the costs of environmental degradation from 
corporate accounts to public ones – either in the form of government payments or socially 
distributed human suffering.  
 
Addressing ecological and climate challenges is made harder by the ways in which 
“nature”  has  come  to  be  understood.  It  has  long  been  seen,  especially  but  not  only  in  the  West,  
as the other to human society, often an obstacle to be overcome – thus obscuring the extent to 
which we too are natural beings and live only as a part of nature. More specific to the rise and 
flourishing  of  capitalism  has  been  the  construction  of  “nature”  as  resources. For capitalism, 
nature has existed to be used, exploited. Examples are familiar, from forests to water. Taking 
just the latter, global freshwater use tripled during the second half of the twentieth century 
(while population doubled). Technological advances let farmers and other water users pump 
groundwater from greater depths, potentially draining aquifers and lowering water tables. 
Building more and larger dams generated electrical power and sometimes controlled flooding, 
but it also displaced people, flooded farms, and killed fish. Rivers are literally running dry 
and lakes disappearing. Attempting to manage by price calculations almost always radically 
underestimates the costs contemporary use imposes on future generations.  
 
Because nature-as-resources always appears limited and capitalism is organized as a 
system of perpetual expansion, capitalism also nurtures efforts to transcend the limits of 
nature. The combination of modern science with business and government backing has been 
remarkably productive of new technologies. These include engineered resources to augment 
natural ones, such as improvements in agriculture, new materials, and new ways of extracting 
energy. Capitalism thus has been basic to increased capacity to support human life, 
complementing  “natural”  potential with intensified agriculture based on fertilizers, 
mechanization, drainage and irrigation, and new crops produced on the basis of research. It 
has also brought science-based medicine with its own range of new technologies from 
pharmaceuticals to equipment-intensive  hospitals.  These  have  extended  “natural”  human  life  
and also enabled more people to live full life-courses. New technologies also include 
production processes and equipment that vastly alter and largely reduce the role of living 
labor in creating new commodities. They include transportation and communication 
technologies that overcome obstacles of distance and geography, and other infrastructural 
technologies that make possible urban life on unprecedented scale. Along with enormous 
infrastructural investments, these have allowed for dramatic expansion in human population, 
massive urbanization and huge increase in geographic mobility.  
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But the new organization of social life has also multiplied demands for energy, met 
especially by carbon sources from coal to petroleum but also by nuclear and other forms of 
power. New technologies have increased demand for a range of minerals. And not only does 
the great expansion in the scale of human life depend on scarce inputs, it comes with the cost 
of large-scale environmental damage, including potentially catastrophic climate change. The 
very intensification of agriculture that boosts food production commonly leads to soil erosion 
and other damage. Newly engineered materials are often less biodegradable. Carbon-based 
energy sources pollute. And a wide range of activities that expand with capitalist growth 
bring global warming. This is, indeed, one of the central reasons why from Rio to Kyoto to 
Doha it has proved so hard to find an international consensus supporting serious action on 
climate change.  
 
More generally, in an era of financialization, efforts to tackle environmental 
degradation themselves become objects of trading. Proposals to manage polluting carbon 
emissions by carbon trading offer a prime example.  Such  “cap  and  trade”  schemes  mean  
setting  a  limit  on  emissions  but  letting  those  who  don’t  pollute  as  much  as  that  notional  limit  
sell  their  alleged  “savings”  to  polluters  to  allow  them  to  pollute  more.  That  such  schemes  
gained traction owed more to the fact that rights to pollute could be profitably bundled into 
securities and traded by investment bankers than to their actual efficacy in reducing emissions. 
 
The extent to which nature is used up or irretrievably damaged is a problem for the 
future of capitalism (as well as life generally). It is a problem that exceeds the categories of 
economic analysis. This is partly because natural resources are extremely hard to price 
appropriately (especially with attention to long-term sustainability). It is also because thinking 
of nature only as resources severely limits understanding of the true character of human 
participation in nature and dependence on the rest of nature.  
 
Understood as essentially limited resources, nature is also an object of competitive 
appropriation among capitalist organizations and the states on which they depend. The 
politics and economics of petroleum have been the standout example of this for a hundred 
years, and especially since the 1970s. But a host of new competitions for scarce resources 
shape the near future and pose challenges to capital as well as to states and human societies. 
Energy is basic. Minerals are needed for modern technologies. Water is in short and 
unpredictable supply and often polluted. Even agricultural farmland is an object of 
competition as arid Arabia and crowded China fight to acquire rights to fertile Africa.  
 
Struggles over resources are also important among the potential provocations to 
geopolitical conflict. They are already basic to a range of mostly small-scale armed conflicts 
that straddle the boundaries among civil wars, interstate wars, and criminal activity. But 
securing natural resources – both oil and a range of minerals - is centrally important to China 
as it grows. And securing these resources entangles China in relations with a far-flung range 
of countries including volatile but significant ones like the newly partitioned two Sudans, 
which sell most of their oil to China. Selling natural resources is crucial to Russia and some 
other parts of the former Soviet Union. Europe is a major importer from Russia, and has 
already been involved in conflicts over supplies on which it depends. Iran is an unpredictable 
power in the Middle East and influence on Muslim populations more widely. The Gulf States 
are major international investors as significant players in the security of the region. If they 
become increasingly unstable, the repercussions will be major. Nigeria, long a prime example 
of  the  “resource  curse”  appears  to  have  begun  a  more  successful  but still fraught path to 
development. Several Latin American countries are significant oil exporters and some, like 
Brazil, are also emerging powers. The US has reduced its dependence on international energy 
sources partly by investments during the financial crisis, including new hydraulic fracturing 
technologies. New capacity to extract oil and gas from shale is perhaps the clearest example 
of a possible technological fix to one of the major threats to the future of capital accumulation 
(more  so  that  “greener”  technologies  that  so  far  have  proved  harder  to  scale  up  
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proportionately to energy demand). But the technological fix brings new environmental conceerns. And capitalism remains deeply entangled in global energy and 
resource politics. The list of powerful countries so entangled could be extended. Energy joins 
with ideological commitments to sovereignty in disputes over islands in East Asia as in the 
politics  of  central  Asia  and  even  Britain’s  post-colonial feud with Argentina.  
 
Energy resources are perhaps the most prominent factors making violent conflict 
more likely but not the only ones. Water and arable land are perhaps as scarce. And beyond 
resources there are tensions over religion, migration, borders, and quasi-imperial desires to 
expand territories – not to mention tensions simply over evidence that neighbors are 
stockpiling weapons or acquiring nuclear capacity. A variety of dictators and non-state actors 
are additional sources of instability and potentially sparks to ignite conflict. And actual 
conflicts of the last decade – especially the invasion of Iraq and lingering war in Afghanistan 
- have both exacerbated tensions and reduced the capacity of the US to complement its 
hegemonic power by effective policing. All this makes war more likely in the future, and 
makes it more likely that small-scale or regional conflicts will become drawn into larger-scale 
geopolitical conflicts. In many ways the forty-five years of Cold War appear as an interlude in 
a longer history of geopolitical conflict and restructuring. 
 
 
The informal sector and illicit capitalism 
  
Together financialization and neoliberalism weakened a variety of institutions crucial 
to stabilizing capitalism in the relatively rich Western countries. These included not only state 
regulatory institutions but also trade unions and even corporations. Business corporations that 
had seemed to be stable frameworks for individual careers ceased to provide health care, 
pensions, and long-term job security; in many cases they ceased to exist as their assets were 
traded in capital markets, stripped of any obligations to employees, communities, or business 
counterparts. Communities were undermined by disruption of economic bases and population 
movements. Formal organizations provided less and less of a safety net to ordinary citizens, 
indeed fewer opportunities as well. The transition was not as sharp a shock as the crisis of 
institutions attendant on the fall of the USSR but it moved in the same direction. Religious 
organizations stepped in not just with charity but also with a range of institutional services 
from employment to counseling. And throughout the OECD countries, local networks 
emerged to organize partially non-cash economies of mutual exchange.  
 
Weak formal institutions are associated with growth in the informal sector. The term 
derives from the efforts (notably by Arthur Lewis and Keith Hart) to describe Third World 
settings where formal institutions had not developed on a national scale and as a result the 
formally recorded, monetary economy contained only a fraction of total economic activity. 
The rest, crucial to the actual survival of much of the population, involved in varying 
combinations  reliance  on  “traditional”  social  relations  repurposed  to  provide  support  in  new  
circumstances, development of new alternatives for formal market relations such as barter, 
and networks of face-to-face relationships in which transactions could be conducted without 
regard to law or taxation. Some of the informal sector activities would be classed as criminal, 
others not. But though the concept originated in studies of the Third World, it is clear that an 
informal sector has always accompanied capitalism and the efforts of nation-states to organize 
legal frameworks to support and cope with it.  
 
The informal sector has expanded dramatically during the last forty years. It is an 
important dimension of economic life in rich countries as well as poor, an important part of 
how people cope with poor performance of public institutions (as during the latter years of 
communism and formally planned economies), and central to how people cope with declining 
provision of public goods (not least in post-transition formerly communist countries but also 
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in capitalist countries imposing regimes of neoliberalism and austerity). Much of this is 
organized on a community level: small-scale barter, cooperative associations, cash trade that 
evades both taxes and the financial industry. The informal sector is not simply a site of social 
problems. It is also a setting for creativity. The garage-based inventors and entrepreneurs who 
form something of a Silicon Valley myth often organized their nascent businesses informally 
(at least in periods when venture capital was hard to come by). So do similar entrepreneurs in 
India and Nigeria today. And so do filmmakers and artists. The informal sector can appear 
sometimes as bohemian, sometimes surprisingly middle class. Its dynamic, attractive 
businesses may or may not pay taxes, however, and their workers may or may not have 
pensions or health insurance. 
 
The informal sector is not just local community networks and other face-to-face 
alternatives to formal markets and formal institutions. It also has a large-scale dimension of 
transnational capitalist structures that operate at least partially outside state institutions and 
laws. The latter include money-laundering, banking, and investments backed up by force as 
well as contracts. They include tax-evasion, trafficking, and a range of illicit flows – from 
minerals (blood diamonds or coltan), to weapons (small arms mostly, but also tanks, aircraft, 
and missiles), to drugs, to people. This often illicit capitalism is often more formally 
organized than  the  name  “informal  sector”  suggests,  and  it has revenues and investments 
running into many trillions of dollars (though not surprisingly hard to calculate precisely).  
 
The already substantial industry of tax evasion and illicit investment flows was 
dramatically heightened by the manner in which communism was replaced by capitalism in 
Russia. To a very large extent this involved the theft of state assets by former state agents and 
their transformation into a mixture of capitalist enterprise with organized crime. This helped 
to give rise to massive illicit trade and poured huge new amounts of money into an already 
thriving global network of illicit markets. Perhaps a trillion dollars worth of unrecorded 
capital flowed quickly from countries like Russia to tax-shelters like Cyprus and the Cayman 
Islands, and then in turn was invested in legal as well as illegal businesses back in Russia and 
around the world.  
 
The importance of both relatively local informal sector activity and large-scale illicit 
capitalism reveal weaknesses in formally recorded capitalist growth. In the first place, this 
growth is unable to accomplish distribution necessary to sustain social life and reproduction. 
Formal capitalism actually depends on the informal sector to maintain the basic conditions of 
life in many societies – and thus the social peace necessary for prosperity of the parts of 
societies based on legitimate markets. This is particularly true in the parts of capitalist 
societies most affected by formal market failures – in slums, for example, where residents 
must rely largely on each other and very small-scale entrepreneurship to survive because both 
large-scale capitalism and the state are ineffective. But it is also true sometimes on larger 
scales, where corruption testifies not just to individual greed but also to institutional 
underdevelopment. Secondly, the large amounts of capital drawn into illicit global trade both 
implicitly tax or siphon funds from the formal sector and make markets and risks less 
predictable. Of course, capital from the illicit sector may also find its way into legitimate 
capital markets and into direct investment in legitimate businesses (where it may or may not 
be accompanied by illegitimate management tactics – like bribery or threats of violence). 
Informalization and corruption undercut state regulation that is needed and they integrate 
legitimate businesses directly or indirectly with illegitimate ones like drug or sex trafficking.  
 
Much  of  global  political  economy  is  organized  in  ways  that  exceed  the  “official”  
world-system of nation-states and capitalism. Collusion between states and corporations, 
organized crime on various scales, the political power of warlords and cartels that hold no 
political office, and the economic power of semi-autonomous parts of states including 
militaries all reveal a more complicated world – and one threatening to capitalism as we know 
it. So do cybersecurity challenges from Wikileaks to hacking, malware, spear-phishing and 
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other tactics deployed sometimes with state backing and sometimes by freelancers, sometimes 
against states and sometimes against corporations. This is part of the transformation of 
capitalism, not all without historical precedent, but with an unclear future. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Though capitalism seems unlikely to collapse next week, it is also unlikely to last 
forever. It remains unwise to imagine the future only in terms of linear projections from the 
present. 
 
Capitalism could be felled by internal contradictions, including its general propensity 
to crises and the specific intensification of risk that has accompanied lopsided financialization 
in much of the world. Indeed, surprisingly little has been done after the 2008-9 market 
meltdown to improve regulation or market structures; the same firms and people remain 
largely in charge. The same risks are therefore still with us.  
 
As important, though, are potentials for external disruption, whether from 
environmental catastrophes, diseases, wars, or rebellions. Infrastructural systems on which 
capitalism depends, like communications networks or energy supplies, could also by 
disrupted, possibly by political actors. For all these reasons, what has been a process of ever-
tighter global integration may be partially reversed. Coping with disruptions may depend on 
more loosely coupled systems with different bases for resilience.  
 
Capitalism could decline without collapsing, simply organizing less of economic 
activity as alternative systems organize more. Growth could slow. This could happen globally 
or, more likely, unevenly by country and region. The ever-tighter integration of global 
markets that capitalism has driven might be slowed or reversed, with differently organized 
systems in different settings. Capitalism might be more central to some of these, more 
hemmed in or marginal in others. Business firms, operating in close relationship to 
governments,  could  manage  economic  relations  more,  leaving  less  to  “free”  markets.  They  
could be organized with more attention to goals other than capital accumulation. Social and 
political institutions might provide stronger or weaker counterbalance to capitalism; illicit 
capitalism could loom larger or smaller. Capitalism could remain a vital part of global 
political economy, thus, but be less dominant. Or a more radically new economic structure 
could develop. 
 
The current crisis is not the first time that capitalism has survived only because states 
were  willing  to  intervene  and  assume  enormous  costs  created  by  capitalist  “excesses”.  Of  
course, the citizens to whom these externalized costs are distributed are often unhappy. But if 
states aid capitalism by absorbing costs firms externalize, they also aid citizens by managing 
risks from unemployment to illness. So far there is little sign of social movements potentially 
able to topple states that impose austerity in order to defend capitalist financial institutions. 
This does remind us, though, that at least as important as capitalist vulnerability to crises is 
the likelihood that capitalism will be undermined by destruction of the political, social and 
environmental conditions on which it depends.  
 
Meeting institutional deficits is a basic challenge. Of course the challenge can be met 
by non-state institutions as well as states, particularly by non-profit organizations but also 
sometimes by capitalist firms where they are stable enough to work as social institutions 
supporting their employees. Contemporary global capitalism is also buffered for many people 
by an informal sector that sustains populations poorly served by existing institutions but that 
also extends into large-scale corruption. A massive illicit sector mingles tax evasion with 
criminal enterprises. Both informal and illicit sectors are interdependent with more formal 
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and legitimate capitalism. Yet they undermine institutions on which it depends, including 
states. 
 
Whether states are able to continue providing operating conditions for capitalist 
growth is a serious question, as much in parts of Europe as in less developed countries more 
commonly  associated  with  the  phrase  ‘fragile  states’.  Fiscal crises complement security 
challenges. Infrastructural and other growth-oriented investments have been hard to deliver 
effectively. Regulating global finance and meeting environmental challenges call for effective 
large-scale, transnational governance structures, but efforts to create these are relatively weak. 
Holding together a global world-system depends on the hegemony and disproportionate 
contributions of some members. US willingness to carry these burdens unilaterally is 
declining but neither a replacement nor a multilateral alternative has emerged. One possibility 
is that the world-system will lose cohesion in favor of competing regional structures – and 
capitalism may matter more in some than others. 
 
Capitalism itself contributes to some  of  the  ‘external’  disruptions  that may challenge 
its future growth – notably environmental degradation and climate change. There may be 
possibilities  for  “green  growth”  that  will  sustain  capitalism  and  deal  with  the  environmental  
challenge. Or there may be limits to growth that make capitalism itself problematic and 
unsustainable, simply because it is in the end a growth machine.  
 
With regard to each sort of threat, there are actions to be taken that could 
counterbalance the damage and mitigate the risks of one-sided capitalist development. These 
could come from for-profit and non-profit entrepreneurs as well as governments. They could 
be pursued by social movements - though so far none have risen to the scale of the global 
challenges. In any case, capitalism cannot thrive if institutions are not reshaped, employment 
restored, and environmental, public health and other challenges addressed. 
 
The large-scale, more or less simultaneous collapse of capitalist markets would be 
catastrophic, not only bringing economic upheaval but also upending political and social 
institutions. It could be precipitated by systemic crises or more likely brought about by 
ecological change or violence. The risk is heightened by capitalist externalization of costs and 
damage both to the environment and to potentially stabilizing social institutions. But 
discontinuous changes are not always sudden or catastrophic. 
 
As I began by suggesting, it is at least as likely that capitalism will be transformed 
over generations, possibly beyond recognition. Arguably stronger states, better agricultural 
productivity, and renewal of religious faith were all solutions to problems in feudal Europe. 
They also transformed it and in the long run brought a new era. The rise of both state risk 
management and economic facilitation and capitalist corporations offered solutions to 
problems in mid-20th century capitalism. These were transformative, though contained in a 
still-capitalist order. 
 
That capitalist order is a very large-scale, highly complex system. The events of the 
last 40 years have deeply disrupted the institutions that kept capitalism relatively well-
organized through the post-war period. Efforts to repair or replace these will change the 
system, just as new technologies and new business or financial practices may. Even a 
successful renewal of capitalism will transform it and the modern world-system within which 
it has driven growth for four hundred years. If nothing else, capitalism will be transformed by 
the extent to which growth is led from outside its longstanding Western core regions and this 
will integrate it with different histories, cultures, and social institutions. 
 
 The question is whether change will be adequate to manage systemic risks and fend 
off external threats. And if not, will there be widespread devastation before a new order 
emerges?  
